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EXTRATERRITORIALITY, CONFLICTS OF JURISDICTION, 
AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 
On December 13, 1981, the regime of General Jaruzelski 
imposed martial law in Poland. The Solidarity labor union was 
suppressed, its leaders interned. A ruling Military Council 
began mass arrests and set up detention camps. President 
Reagan denounced the Polish regime for "trampl[ing] underfoot 
its solemn commitments to the UN Charter and the Helsinki 
accords." He denounced the Soviet Union for its threats and 
pressures which bore a major share of the blame for the 
repression in Poland. On December 29, he unveiled a seriei:o.f 
economic sanctions against the Soviet and Polish governments. 
·The steps included the suspension of licenses for the export or 
reexport to the Soviet Union of equipment and technology for 
transmission and refining of petroleum and natural gas. On 
June 18, 1982, the sanctions were further extended to prohibit 
any such exports by U.S. subsidiaries or licensees abroad. 
There followed, through the rest of 1982, a major.dispute 
between the United States and its most important allies over 
the effect and legality of the sanctions we had imposed. The 
usually dry and esoteric issues of international law suddenly 
became dramatic issues of political conflict, grand strategy, 
and global,diplomacy. 
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International law, instead of mitigating conflict, became a 
battleground, until the underlying dispute was eased by 
diplomacy. 
The legal dispute was over what is sometimes called 
extraterritoriality. I prefer the term "conflicts of 
jurisdiction," which describes the issue more neutrally and 
analytically. In a wide variety of situations the United · 
States and other countries attempt to apply their laws or 
regulations to conduct or property beyond their national 
boundaries. The resulting international disputes can become 
particularly serious when the legal arguments embody majot:: ., _ 
.. -···· 
disagreements over foreign policy, as in the Polish sanctions 
case. Thus conflicts of jurisdiction are at the intersection 
of law and diplomacy, making the topic especially appropriate 
for a Deputy Secretary of State to discuss before this learned 
Society. 
One of the aims of the American Society of International 
Law has been "to promote the establishment and maintenance of 
international relations on the basis of law and justice." That 
is a good statement of one of our principal national objectives 
in both international law and foreign policy. 
/ 
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Let me give you a brief survey of the conflicts problem, 
and then I shall outline the program of concrete steps that the 
U.S. Government is taking to show its willingness to resolve, 
or ease, the kinds of difficulties that have arisen. 
Roots of the Problem 
The international problem of conflicts of jurisdiction has 
an ancient history • 
. The concept of extraterritoriality antedated the 
nation-state as we now know it. Through Roman and medieval;;..,. 
times, a citizen was subject to the jurisdiction of his 
sovereign wherever he traveled. More recently, for centuries, 
consuls of some powerful states were able to exercise criminal 
and civil jurisdiction over their nationals in foreign 
countries. As early as the 15th century, Venetians traveling 
in the Ottoman Empire gain~d exemption from Ottoman 
jurisdiction. Soon Sardinians, Tuscans, Austrians, Russians 
and others carved out similar privileges in Ottoman domains. 
The other most famous case is China in the 19th century. Many 
European colonial powers gained the right to apply their own 
laws to their nationals in China through diplomatic or consular 
courts. 
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The United States engaged in the practice as well. We 
gained extraterritorial rights in regions of the Ottoman Empire 
by the 1830 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Turkey. 
These rights lasted until 1949. In China, the United States 
obtained extraterritorial jurisdiction through the 1844 Treaty 
of Peace, Amity and Commerce, and did not terminate it until 
1943. 
When the treaty to relinquish extraterritorial rights in 
China was before the U.S. Senate in 1943, the Foreign Relations 
Committee's report somewhat nostalgically observed that the 
practice of extraterritoriality had had a benign purpose. I~~ 
had been intended, the Committee said, "to diminish friction, 
minimize causes of conflict, and contribute to the maintenance 
of conditions of law and order." As we now know, the practice 
had the opposite effect. The Chinese today view it as a symbol 
of the humiliations imposed on them by the colonial powers 
·during the period of their national weakness. The issue had 
quite literally revolutionary implications. In this modern age 
of nationalism, every nation is extraordinarily sensitive to 
other countries' assertions of jurisdiction that seem to 
impinge on the sacred domain of national sovereignty. 
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The irony is that the modern world also generates its own, 
almost unavoidable conditions of jurisdictional conflict. We 
live in a world of increasing economic interdependence. The 
rapidly growing scale of international trade and investment in 
the postwar period has brought with it a vast expansion of law, 
regulation, and legal complexity. The result is that even 
among the closest allies, claims of jurisdiction are bound 
frequently to collide. Consider the enormous expansion of 
world trade.: The decade of the 1970 's was a period of oil 
shocks and recessions: .nevertheless, between 1970 and 1980 
world exports increased from $328 billion to over $2 trillion. 
American exports alone increased from $43_billion to over $JJ9 
billion. Foreign.direct investment in the United States 
dncreased almost five-fold. 
In this modern environment of commercial expansion and 
interaction, the United States and other nations often judge 
that their civil and criminal law must reach conduct abroad 
that has substantial and direct effects on their economies, 
their interests, and their citizens. Needless to say, one 
nation's assessment of its legal necessity often runs up 
against another nation's conception of its national sovereignty. 
•. 
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Problems of conflicting jurisdiction can take many forms. 
Some conflicts arise from relatively routine applications of 
domestic law and regulation which do not mesh with other 
countries' practice. Other conflicts arise from basic clashes 
of national policy deeply held convictions, expressed in 
either domestic or foreign policy, which conflict with the 
views of other countries. 
Let me discuss both kinds of cases. 
Conflicts of Procedure 
ff - -~. 
In all our countries, expanding bodies of statutory and 
regulatory law may impel governments or courts to attempt to 
reach beyond the confines of the national territory. 
Our Internal Revenue Service, for example, may seek 
·documents in the possession of an enterprise in a foreign 
country in order to enforce the proper allocation of taxable 
income among affiliated companies. Our Securities and Exchange 
Commission may seek the identity of Swiss bank depositors 
suspected of insider trading in U.S. securities markets. 
·------~----··-·--
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Our courts may attempt to serve process overseas or to attach 
sanctions to the failure of foreign witnesses to testify. Our 
laws prohibiting compliance with foreign economic boycotts 
against friendly countries apply 
subsidiaries of American companies. 
by statute -- to overseas 
We in the United States have a long domestic experience 
with the differing laws of fifty states. Perhaps for that 
reason we seem to be more comfortable with multiple claims of 
jurisdiction and much less deferential to the idea of absolute 
territorial sovereignty. But the United States is not alone in 
applying its law to foreign entities or transactions. The·;:; .. 
Commission of. the.European Communities is now developing a 
6eries of regulations which would affect the operations of 
transnational corporations. One such regulation -- the 
so-called Vredeling proposal -- would require subsidiaries in 
the EC to disclose to their local employees certain decisions 
and actions of the corporate parent abroad, which have direct 
effects on those employees. This regulation would apply, for 
example, to investment and plant closing decisions. 
In another area, the European Commission's antitrust 
authorities are considering remedies in a proceeding against 
IBM that would require IBM to disclose what it considers trade 
secrets. 
- 8 -
Both the Vredeling and the IBM developments have a large 
potential impact on American firms and t~eir operations outside 
the EC. The U.S. government is watching them closely. Some, 
of course, may savor the prospect of American discomfiture at 
other countries' attempts to exert an extraterritorial reach. 
The larger lesson, however, is that the conditions impelling 
countries to move in this direction· are universal, powerful, 
and troublesome for all countries. 
Perhaps the classic modern case of conflicts of 
jurisdiction is antitrust law. The United Kingdom, Australia, 
and some other important friendly countries simply do not 
accept the "effects test" as a legitimat~ basis of jurisdiction 
to regulate economic conduct under international law. The 
effects test was initially enunciated in Judge Learned Hand's 
1945 Alcoa decision and is the first step in the jurisdictional 
analysis performed by federal courts today. It applies U.S. 
antitrust law to conduct abroad having substantial, direct, and 
foreseeable effects on U.S. domestic or foreign commerce. 
The United States is not alone in its adherence to the 
effects test. In the Philip Morris case, the Federal Republic 
of Germany has claimed jurisdiction over a multinational merger 
on the basis of even indirect effects on the West German 
market. 
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The EC Commission has claimed jurisdiction to investigate 
alleged conspiratorial conduct in the wood-pulp industry --
conduct occurring outside the EC -- on the basis of effects 
within the EC. But ironically this growing parallelism only 
increases the inherent potential for conflict, raising the 
prospect of proliferating challenges to multinational 
ente·rprises by both the United States ~ the European 
Community. 
Particularly acute. conflicts have arisen from private 
treble-damage cases brought against foreign companies in 
American courts. The treble-damage remedy was designed 
American law to ~ring about more effective antitrust 
in'' - . 
., .,. ·.~--
. enforcement, encouraging "private attorneys-general" by use of 
a financial incentive. Our public enforcement authorities 
the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department and the 
Federal Trade Commission -- can balance a broad range of public 
interests when they make enforcement decisions (though foreign 
governments may still be unhappy with the outcome). Private 
parties in antitrust litigation have no such responsibility. 
They may even have an incentive to maximize the detrimental 
effect on our foreign relations in order to promote a favorable 
settlement. This has led some foreign governments to criticize 
private treble-damage actions as "rogue elephants". 
'. 
'1 
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Conflicts of Policy 
The problem of conflicts of jurisdiction is heightened 
where there is a conflict of substantive doctrine as well as 
competing procedural claims. Indeed, antitrust law provides 
several examples of significant disputes over broad public and 
international policy. 
With only limited exceptions, U.S. law and policy reflect 
our belief that the marketplace should decide what price to set 
for goods and services and which competitors will survive the 
cycles of economic fortune. As the Supreme Court said in_th~-
Brown Shoe and Brunswick cases, antitrust regulation of the 
marketplace is meant "to protect competition, not 
competitors." By contrast, many of our trading partners favor 
-- indeed, often encourage -- the creation of cartels, 
particularly for export of products and natural resources. 
These differing views over the role of the marketplace were 
manifested in the Swiss Watchmakers case. The Swiss 
Government, starting at least in 1951, authorized and 
encouraged the formation of a watch export cartel involving 
both Swiss and U.S. companies. In 1962, the U.S. Department of 
Justice challenged the cartel under the Sherman Act because it 
had anticompetitive effects in the U.S. market. The U.S • 
. 
District Court subsequently entered a consent decree barring 
the challenged conduct. 
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The Swiss Watchmakers case demonstrates that where an activity 
has an impact on two or more jurisdictions, conflict will arise 
if they are pursuing contrary policies. And the mechanical 
application of the principle of territoriality will not either 
satisfactorily or permanently resolve that conflict. In 
American law, antitrust doctrine remains not a matter of 
o~dinary regulation but a national policy so important that the 
Supreme Court, in the Topco case, termed it the "Magna Carta of 
free enterprise." 
These differing conceptions of the international order 
bring us to the realm of foreign policy, where some of the"most 
;; ::! ~-· 
dramatic cases of conflicts of jurisdiction have occurred. 
The United States has resorted to economic controls in 
several instances as an instrument of foreign or national 
security policy. In the case of our export controls over trade 
with Communist countries, there have been many instances of 
disagreements with our trading partners. In a famous example 
in the mid-1960's, French President de Gaulle reopened trade 
relations with China at a time when U.S.-China relations were 
still locked in bitter hostility. This action quickly found 
its way into court. 
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In 1965, the United States attempted to prevent the French 
subsidiary of Freuhauf, an American manufacturer of 
tractor-trailers, from selling trailers to China. The company 
sought relief from a French court, which took over operation of 
the subsidiary and appointed a receiver who required delivery 
of the trailers to China. In the end, the territorial 
sov~reign -- in this case, France -- was allowed to control the 
enterprise at issue. But the underlying policy conflict 
endured, at least until 1971, when one of the jurisdictions 
involved that is, the United States began to harmonize 
its China policy with that of the other. 
ff-.·-:..· 
The dispute over Polish sanctions was an even more vivid 
example of a legal dispute that was in its essence a dispute 
over policy. We and our allies condemned the Soviet-backed 
declaration of martial law in Poland and the suppression of 
human rights. To signify that "business as us~al" could not 
continue with those who oppressed the Polish people, the 
President imposed economic sanctions against the Soviet and 
Polish governments. These sanctions included, inter alia, 
controls over exports of oil and gas equipment and technology 
to the USSR. 
The President imposed the sanctions under the Export 
Administration Act of 1979. 
------ - ------------------
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The Act authorizes controls over goods or technology "subject 
to the jurisdiction of the United Statei or exported by any 
person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States," where 
necessary to further national security or foreign policy_ 
objectives of the United States. Where llnational security" 
controls are involved, fewer disputes arise between the United 
States and its allies. Goods and technology which make a 
direct and significant contribution to Soviet military 
potential are prohibited by all allied countries. When the 
controls are imposed o.n "foreign policy" grounds, however --
such as in the Polish case -- different perspectives are more 
likely to exist. ~ -·. 
The legal dispute with our allies over Polish sanctions 
focused on the American effort to reach conduct abroad and on 
the issue of sanctity of contracts. The sanctions announced on 
December 29, 1981, prohibited exports and reexports of oil and 
gas equipment and technology to the Soviet Union regardless of 
preexisting contractual obligations: the sanctions extended to 
goods of U.S. origin already in foreign hands. On June 18, 
1982, the controls were extended to prohibit the export of 
wholly foreign-made goods, or the use of previously obtained 
U.S. technology, by foreign subsidiaries or licensees of U.S. 
firms. Our allies objected to the interruption of contracts 
already signed. They objected to the so-called 
"extraterritorial" reach of the sanctions. 
' I 
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American parents of the foreign subsidiaries, such as Dresser 
Industries, and licensees of American technology, brought 
numerous administrative proceedings and lawsuits against the 
U.S. Department of Commerce. In response, this government took 
the same position that administration after administration, and 
Congress after Congress, have taken -- namely, that the 
relationship between a parent and a subsidiary, or the use of 
American technology by a licensee, justifies the assertion of 
American jurisdiction when substantial American interests are 
involved. 
But the issue was not resolved in the courts. It was 
settled by diplomacy. The underlying dispute was on the 
broader question of economic relations with the Soviet Union. 
Events in Poland demonstrated that East-West trade has not 
had a moderating effect on Soviet behavior as some -- in the 
United States and elsewhere in the Alliance -- had thought it 
would. The original theory of East-West trade was that the 
Soviet Union would be restrained in its international behavior 
for fear of jeopardizing its trade with the West. Quite 
possibly, dependence on East-West trade may have added to the 
inhibitions on Western responses to Soviet misconduct. 
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It has also become clear since the late 1970's that the Soviet 
Union is gaining considerable benefit from access to Western 
high technology, both for·direct military application and for 
upgrading the economic base which supports the Soviet military 
establishment. For these reasons, the United States, since at 
least.the Ottawa Summit of 1981, had questioned the wisdom of 
providing the Soviets with advanced equipment -- and 
particularly with subsidized credits -- to construct the 
natural gas pipeline from Siberia to western Europe. Such a 
project would provide the Soviets with foreign exchange, 
enhance their technological capability, and create what we 
viewed as an unfortunate degree of dependence on energy ~rade 
with the Soviet·Union. 
The dispute over the Polish sanctions highlighted the need 
for a new consensus within the Alliance on East-West economic 
relations. Our sanctions on oil and gas equipment, as you 
know, were lifted on November 13, 1982. On that day the 
President also announced that the major industrial nations of 
the West recognized "the necessity of conducting their 
relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe on the basis of a 
global and comprehensive policy designed to serve their common 
fundamental interests." As a result, a consensus was reached 
with our allies: 
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-- First, not to engage in trade arrangements which 
contribute to the military or strategic.advantage of the Soviet 
Union. 
Second, not to give preferential aid to the heavily 
militarized Soviet economy • 
. -- And third, not to sign any new natural gas contracts 
with the Soviet Union, pending a new Alliance study on energy 
alternatives. 
We also agreed to strengthen existing controls on the 
transfer of strategic.items to the USSR, and to examine whether 
our collective security ·requires new controls on certain kinds 
ft .. ··.;,, 
•. . 
of high technology not currently controlled, including oil and 
gas equipment. And we agreed to work toward harmonizing our 
export credit policies. 
There is an important lesson here, and indeed it is the 
main theme I want to put before you tonight. When these 
disputes over jurisdiction turn out to be grounded in disputes 
over policy, the most effective solution is a major effort to 
harmonize our policies. This may not make the legal disputes 
go away, but it will surely make them less divisive. The 
democratic nations have an even deeper interest in resolving 
these policy conflicts -- not only to make lawyers' lives 
easier but to preserve the political unity of the Western 
Alliance. · 
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And that Alliance is, without exaggeration, the foundation of 
the legal, economic, and political system of the democratic 
West. 
In the coming decades, the problem of maintaining allied 
cohesion over foreign policy will not necessarily become 
easier. In the early years of the postwar period, American 
power was so preponderant within the Alliance that our 
prescriptions very often received ready acceptance from allies 
weakened by the war and dependent on American economic aid and 
military protection. Today, our allies are strong, 
self-confident, and independent-minded. Unanimity will h~r..clly 
.: .: .~·· 
be automatic. The United States still has the responsibility 
to state its convictions, and act on them, on matters of vital 
importance to free world security. Harmonizing policies will 
require determined effort on the part of all. 
Measures for the Future 
The United States is prepared to do its part in finding 
cooperative solutions to the problems I have discussed. We are 
prepared to be responsive to the concerns of others. If our 
allies join with us in the same spirit, much can be done. 
First of all, the United States will continue to seek to 
resolve the policy differences that underlie many of these 
r.nnfl;cts over iurisdiction. 
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Thus, for example, we will work with our allies toward the goal 
of a new consensus on the important strategic issue of 
East-West trade. 
Second, the United States can seek to minimize conflicts by 
shaping and applying appropriate guidelines to govern 
assertions of authority over conduct abroad where those 
assertions conflict with foreign law. The American Law 
Institute is now considering a third draft Restatement of 
Foreign Relations Law. The draft now gives a prominent place 
to the balancing of competing state interests in determining 
the existence of jurisdiction over foreign conduct. We in "t·h.e 
Department of State are not altogether satisfied with making a 
balancing test the prerequisite to the existence of 
jurisdiction. As a practical matter, however, a careful 
weighing of the interests of the states concerned is obviously 
a useful procedure and a deterrent to unwarranted conflicts. 
We welcome the federal courts' use of a general balancing 
analysis in private cases like Timberlane, Mannington Mills, 
and Mitsui. Balancing can certainly help to ensure that 
decisions affecting significant foreign concerns are not taken 
lightly. 
Third, the United States is making clear its intention to 
avoid further problems of retroactive application of economic 
controls. 
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We know that the reliability of contracts is essential to the 
health and growth of commerce. Last week the President 
transmitted to Congress legislation to a~end and extend the 
Export Administration Act of 1979. The Administration bill 
strengthens the national security export controls and their 
enforcement, while at the same time easing some of the problems 
we bave had in the past over foreign policy controls: 
The bill declares explicitly that 11 it is the policy of 
the United States, when imposing new foreign policy 
controls, to minimize the impact on pre-existing 
contracts and on business activities in allied o~-
other friendly countries to the extent consistent with 
the underlying purpose of the controls. 11 
The bill also explicitly recognizes the sanctity of 
contracts as a limitation which will insulate many 
existing contracts from disruption by new foreign 
policy export controls. Specifically, the bill 
protects existing sales contracts require delivery 
within 270 days from the imposition of controls, 
unless the President determines that a prohibition of 
such exports is required by the "overriding national 
interest" of the United States. 
I. 
I 
I 
-· 
----------------------~ 
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To strengthen enforcement of the national security 
export controls, the bill authorizes restrictions on 
future imports into the United States of goods or 
technology from persons abroad who violate these 
controls. Controls on imports into the United States 
by particular foreign violators are obviously 
territorial and therefore are clearly within our 
jurisdiction under international law. 
Fourth, the Administration is seeking other legislative 
changes that will indirectly, but we hope effectively, reduce 
the significance of conflicts of jurisdiction. The Justic~.~. 
fl .. ··-
Department, for example, has recently proposed amendments to 
·the Clayton Antftrust Act to allow treble damages only in cases 
of~~ violations. While these amendments would continue to 
permit treble-damage suits in cases of cartelization, they 
would reduce some friction concerning U.S. policy in such areas 
as regulation of vertical relationships, including 
supplier/purchaser relationships. 
Fifth, the Departments of State and Justice are considering 
further statutory proposals to address problems arising in the 
international context from private treble-damage actions. I do 
not mean to criticize any particular past cases or to suggest 
any outcome for any cases now before the courts. 
I 
' 
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Nevertheless, we are exploring ways of ensuring that private 
antitrust cases posing conflicts of jurisdiction are indeed 
consonant with the overall public interest. The Attorney 
General's actions in this area are informed by considerations 
of international comity and balancing. When private 
attorneys-general act, similar considerations should be applied. 
Sixth, we are seeking to expand the practice of prior 
notice, consultation, and cooperation with foreign governments 
wherever regulatory, enforcement, or investigative actions 
raise a danger of conflicts. The Antitrust Division and the 
Federal Trade Commission have pioneered in the practice of~~ 
.:: i:: ~·· 
routinely providing advance notice to other governments of 
.their actions affecting foreign parties. Such consultation is 
carried out either pursuant to multilateral guidelines 
developed in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) or under bilateral agreements with 
particular countries. 
Seventh, in a related vein, we will be seeking procedures 
whereby regulatory, investigatory, or enforcement actions that 
substantially involve other countries' interests will be 
coordinated with the Department of State. The State Department 
can advise about foreign concerns, suggest procedures for 
notice to and consultation with foreign governments, and 
otherwise help agencies do their job without unnecessary 
.. 
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We are eager to conclude agreements to expedite the exchange of 
investigatory information, particularly to combat tax evasion. 
We believe that some international disputes can be avoided or 
eased by this means. 
In some cases, as in our relations with the Securities and 
Exchange Commision, this kind of arrangement is working well. 
In other situations, improvement is needed. We therefore will 
be calling on the agencies concerned to work with us and give 
us prior notice of actions which pose a potential problem of 
conflicts of jurisdiction. 
ft ;:a. •.. 
The Need for Cooperation 
These measures will not eliminate the problem of conflicts 
of jurisdiction. But the United States is eager to do what it 
can to minimize such problems in the future. ·we value our 
relations with our partners. 
Any one of our countries may, on some occasion in the 
future, feel that its national interest or public policy cannot 
be served without an assertion of jurisdiction which leads to a 
disagreement with its partners. The complexity of the modern 
interdependent world, and the reality of greater equality among 
the major industrial nations, make these occurrences almost 
inevitable. 
,';,,, . 
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The problem is ripe for creative legal thinking. It also 
calls for statesmanship to ensure that the fundamental 
political and moral unity of the democracies is not torn by 
disputes over policy. 
All of the industrial democracies face the same larger 
responsibility: How do we reconcile our sovereign independence 
as nations with the imperative of our unity as allies? How do 
we balance our interest in expanding trade and jobs and 
prosperity with our interest in not contributing to the growth 
of Soviet power? 
Once again the great enterprise of the law touches upon 
·some of the most profound questions of our national and 
international life. 
